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Abstract: This essay contextualises the emergence of a document regime which regulated
routine travel through the deployment of the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme in
1952. It suggests that such travel documents were useful for the new Indian state to
delineate citizenship and the nationality of migrants and individual travellers from
Pakistan. The bureaucratic and legal mediations under the Scheme helped the Indian
state to frame itself before its new citizens as the sole certifier of some of their rights as
Indians. In contrast, applicants for these documents viewed them as utilitarian, meant to
facilitate their travel across the new borders. The contrast and contestation between such
different perceptions helps us to understand the continued significance of documentary
identities in contemporary India.

Keywords: passports, visas, Muslim citizenship; Hindu citizenship, India, border,
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H. Roy
In the summer of 1955, N. Basar Khan and his wife, Amirunnissa, residents of Madras,
applied to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in India for Indian passports. They
planned to visit Basar Khan’s ailing mother in Peshawar in Pakistan.1 They applied for
the India–Pakistan passport that had specifically regulated travel between India and
Pakistan since October 1952. Although the Khans’ applications were routine requests for
travel, they were denied. The MHA, in consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA),2 determined that Khan and his wife were not Indians but Pakistanis, and
therefore ineligible to hold Indian passports. They noted that although Khan’s birthplace,
Peshawar, had been part of British India when he was born in 1923, it had become part of
Pakistan in 1947. The officials reasoned that this made Khan a Pakistani. If Khan was a
Pakistani, then his wife (who was born in Madras) had become a Pakistani as well by
virtue of her marriage.3 Other considerations, such as Khan’s residence in Madras since
1943, his employment there as a driver for a local import-export company, or a
recommendation from the local authorities that he be given a restricted passport for
travel, mattered little.4
Why and how did Indian authorities determine that Khan and his wife were
Pakistanis? The couple indicated no desire to migrate to Pakistan, nor was their
application meant to recognise national status. How did the travel request, temporary by
definition, confirm nationality and formal citizenship? This article suggests that in the
1950s, as the newly-independent Indian state debated the different criteria for citizenship
1

Grant of an India–Pakistan passport, Shri N. Basar Khan and his wife, 1955, MEA, 41(61) 55PSP, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI).
2
The MHA and MEA were the key central ministries in India tasked with determining various
policies regarding international travel, national security and citizenship.
3
Until the Citizenship Act of 1955, women’s nationality transferred to their husbands’ nationality
on marriage.
4
Grant of an India–Pakistan passport, Shri N. Basar Khan and his wife, 1955.
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of India, the movement of individuals and families across India’s borders with Pakistan
became essential to such deliberations. While scholars have argued that Partition refugees
were central to citizenship debates,5 I shift focus to those who sought to move
temporarily, either to maintain contact with their extended families, now in a different
country, or to navigate the uncertainties of the post-Partition moment.
This article directs attention to such intermittent and often casual movement to
highlight it, rather than Partition-related migration, informed debates around Indian
citizenship in the decades after Independence. In the 1950s, such routine movement came
under official scrutiny through the imposition of documents such as passports, visas,
Emergency Certificates, No Objection Certificates, repatriation and migration certificates.
I argue that, through the imposition of what I call a documentary regime on what
previously had been unrestricted movement, the Indian state (and the Pakistani state)
sought to establish themselves as sole arbiters on the issue of movement beyond their
borders. A well thought-out plan to impose documentary control over mobility, I argue,
also helped Indian authorities differentiate between travellers, migrants, citizens and noncitizens, and extend certain rights of formal, if not legal, citizenship on those who carried
these documents. These documents guaranteed certain ‘paper rights’ to their holders: the
right to exit and return to the nation-state; and implied some others: the right to residence,
domicile and work; the right not to be deported; and in some cases, the right to be
naturalised as Indian citizens under the Citizenship of India Act of 1955. Further, such a
documentary regime was not an automatic response to becoming a territorial nation-state.
Instead I suggest that such a regime borrowed from previous genealogies of documentary
Joya Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946–1970’, in The Historical Journal,
Vol. 55, no. 4 (2012), pp. 1049–71; and Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents An
Indian History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
5
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identities, and evolved slowly as a process through the complex interactions between the
state’s legal system, its bureaucrats and politicians, and ordinary people who consistently
tested the regulatory intentions.
A central artefact of this evolving documentary regime was the India–Pakistan
Passport and Visa Scheme (hereafter the Scheme), which in October 1952 proposed a
specific passport system between India and Pakistan. The Scheme emerged out of a need
to standardise the post-Partition permit system that had, from 1948, regulated Partition
migration between India and West Pakistan. Under the Scheme, travellers between India
and Pakistan would now be required to obtain the India–Pakistan Passport and apply for
travel to the other country before embarking on their travels. Further, it sought to
delineate the reasons for travel—work, family visits, and permanent migration—in order
to categorise movement. The Scheme established a direct link between the new Indian
nation-state and its inhabitants. The process of applying for these documents required
travellers to answer a set of predetermined questions, and engage with the bureaucratic
regimen of the new state. These questions led to lengthy inquisitions and investigations,
and sometimes court appearances, in order to prove residence and national allegiance.
Such documents were at the forefront of certifying nationality, so creating a link between
the abstract nation-state and its citizens.
In essence, passports and visas introduced a new notion of documentary identity
into a relatively paperless and non-literate society. The booklet, India–Pakistan Passport
and Visa Scheme, guaranteed the ‘right to return’ to India and, consequently, implied
inclusion within the nation-state. Passport identities quickly became nationalised
identities. Those who held these passports could clearly be identified as nationals of India
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or Pakistan, and they now had documentary proof of their national allegiance. Nonownership of these papers or unsuccessful applications for the Indian passport exposed a
person to the possibility of being officially marked as an infiltrator, or a Pakistani
national, and often both. It also exposed one to the possibility of deportation or
incarceration.
The imposition of passports and visas6 incorporated and deployed a range of
bureaucratic and legal apparatuses and personnel. The Indian state emerged as the sole
guarantor of the rights of nationality and citizenship.7 The central ministries—the
Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs—and legal institutions
such as High Courts and the Supreme Court, the local district magistrate and the police,
were brought in to help in implementing the Scheme. While passport operations in British
India had been similar in their aim to control mobility, the Scheme differed because it had
a restricted mandate to control mobility between India and Pakistan only. It was also new
in its specific relationship with the movement of, and consequent ascriptions of legal
status of, Muslim minorities in post-Partition India. Time and again, the documentary
regime was informed and influenced by cases of Muslims, such as Bashar Khan, which
not only received additional scrutiny, but were open to contextual interpretation. Mobility
of Muslim men was taken as evidence of disloyalty to the Indian nation and pro-Pakistan
sentiments.8 The India–Pakistan Passport thus became material proof of a desire for an

6

These documents are part of a larger ongoing process of documenting identity through ration
cards, caste certificates, citizenship certificates and, most recently, the biometric Aadhar card.
7
Adam McKeown argues that the process of creating nation-states created new identities by
removing people from traditional social identities that were determined by who knows or vouches
for a person, and redefined people into bureaucratic categories. Adam McKeown, Asian
Migration and Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
8
In the post-Partition context, this was not new and several scholars have noted the prevalence of
automatic assumptions of disloyalty regarding Muslims in India. See Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can a
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alternative nationality. Furthermore, Muslims like Basar Khan, who were born outside
the new territories of independent India, were often identified simply as ‘Pakistanis’ and
told to apply for Pakistani passports. Taylor Sherman, in a recent essay on Hyderabad in
1949, has shown that resident Afghans, Pathans and Arabs, some of whom were moneylenders or petty traders, began to be regarded as ‘Pakistani’ and that such everyday
understandings of citizenship became tied to being ‘Muslim’.9
In the period when legal understandings of citizenship had yet to become clear,
the India–Pakistan Passport became more than a travel document in the eyes of the Indian
state. The right to mobility was one of the first ways in which Indian citizenship and
claims of belonging would be defined and then contested. Thus Basar Khan’s residence
in Madras did not raise claims to Indian nationality and the authorities remained
unconcerned with his living in India. It was only when Khan required permission to travel
to another country that his nationality became debatable. That the Indian authorities
focused on his place of birth rather than his continued residence and domicile in India in
determining Khan’s nationality highlights how, in the case of Muslims, routine
interactions with the Indian state often had to negotiate demands of citizenship and
loyalty.
This article is divided into three sections. The first traces a genealogy of the
India–Pakistan passport through its colonial avatar, the British Indian passport, and links
it to the emergence of the permit system in 1948. The British Indian passport had a

Muslim be an Indian?’, in Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya (eds), Partition and PostColonial South Asia: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2008) Vol. 3, pp. 59–82; Chatterji, ‘South
Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946–52’, pp. 1049–71; and Taylor Sherman, ‘Migration,
Citizenship and Belonging in Hyderabad (Deccan), 1946–1956’, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol.
45, no. 1 (2011), pp. 81–107.
9
Sherman, ‘Migration, Citizenship, and Belonging’, p. 107.

6

South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies
history of surveillance, verification and guaranteed passage within and outside the British
Empire for specific groups of people. The permit system, instituted after Partition, drew
upon some of these pre-1948 links between documenting identity and mobility
established by the colonial predecessor. The Scheme had an earlier history informed by
colonial understandings of mobility and identity, as well as by communal logic in the
immediate aftermath of Partition. As we will see, the Scheme inherited some of these
facets but also brought into sharper focus the contextual aspects of documenting identity.
The second section examines the processes surrounding the implementation of the
Scheme in 1952. It shows that even though the regulations under the Scheme appeared to
be detailed and comprehensive, its official passage was plagued by inter-Dominion
wrangling and its implementation was uneven. It explores the piecemeal, contextual, and
often protracted technologies of implementing a document regime that turned routine
border-crossers into spies, dissidents and infiltrators. The third section focuses
specifically on Muslims whose applications for an India–Pakistan passport raised
questions regarding their citizenship and helped link travel documents with rights of
belonging and residence.
I would like to add an initial caveat about the scope of this article. The ability of
the Indian state to enforce the documentary regime that it conceived proved very limited
due to lack of resources, the ethno-linguistic similarities of the border-crossers,10 and the
volume of migrants, especially between India and East Pakistan. More people remained
‘undocumented’ when they crossed the border than those who crossed carrying India–

Willem Van Schendel’s excellent work on the Bengal borderland clearly indicates the inability
of India and Bangladesh to control the border, especially smuggling and the movement of people
living in the borderland, and the consequent ongoing border disputes. See Willem van Schendel,
The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia (London: Anthem Press, 2005).
10
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Pakistan passports. These undocumented travellers and migrants become more visible via
the numbers estimated and published in official press reports, in the arrest records of
border police files, and as faceless yet collective groups in the debates surrounding the
India–Pakistan passport. This article focuses primarily on non-paradigmatic cases that left
a paper trail in official files, legal cases, police verification reports, and contemporary
news accounts. These cases help illuminate the limits of statecraft in the 1950s, the
foundational decade of post-colonial state formation; and the actions of those who
acquired documents in the hope of gaining ‘paper rights’. In that sense, the goal of the
paper is to turn our attention to the continuing links between documentary and legal
identity in contemporary India.

Genealogy of a Document
Passports and Certificates of Identity by themselves were not something new to
the Indian subcontinent. Documents regulating travel can be traced back to the mid
nineteenth century when the English East India Company issued documents guaranteeing
consular protection. Later documents regulated travel for Hajj pilgrims,11 indentured
labour, and migration to Australia, the Caribbean, Mauritius and eastern Africa12
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The incorporation of
technology such as fingerprinting and photography helped define the carriers of these
11

Radhika Singha provides an interesting description of the implementation of the pilgrim passes
and ‘return’ tickets for Hajj pilgrims. See her ‘Passport, Ticket, and India-Rubber Stamp: ‘The
Problem of the Pauper Pilgrim’ in Colonial India (c. 1882–1925)’, in Ashwini Tambe and Harald
Fisher Tiné (eds), The Limits of British Control in South Asia: Spaces of Disorder in the Indian
Ocean Region (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 49–83.
12
Such documents included coolie agreements for the sugar colonies, passbooks for Mauritius
etc. See Marina Carter, Servants, Sirdars, and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834–1874 (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1995); and Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery; The Export of Indian
Labour Overseas, 1830–1920 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
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documents as individuals with a fixed identity, thus removing people from their
traditional social identities and redefining them in bureaucratic and legal categories.13 In
the case of British India, as Radhika Singha has shown, constructing new identities which
could be verified through cross-referenced files was already underway not only for
indentured labour, but also for various castes and ‘Criminal Tribes’. Individuals had to
reproduce their recorded identities to gain access to military service, pensions, land
grants, indenture contracts, and similar interactions with the colonial state.14
While a number of different kinds of travel documents co-existed to control travel
and migration in British India, in 1912 the British Indian passport emerged; it attested
that its holder was a British subject of ‘certain means and respectability’.15 On one level,
as Radhika Mongia suggests, its emergence, foregrounded in the debates on the fate of
Indian migrants in Canada and South Africa, ‘nationalized bodies along racial lines’.16
On another level, it allowed the colonial government to claim it maintained ‘international

13

Several scholars have shown how new technical and bureaucratic identities emerged with the
adoption of forensic scientific practices and their use in migration control by the state. See Jane
Caplan and John Torpey (eds), Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State
Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). Also relevant
here is the discussion of the United States passport by Craig Robertson. He makes the argument
that this document soon became shorthand for the identity of its holder. Craig Robertson, The
Passport in America: The History of a Document (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
14
Radhika Singha, ‘Settle, Mobilize, Verify: Identification Practices in Colonial India’, in Studies
in History, Vol. 16, no. 2 (2000), pp. 151–98.
15
Radhika Singha, ‘The Great War and a “Proper” Passport for the Colony: Border-Crossing in
British India c. 1822–1922’, in Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. 50, no. 3
(2013), p. 313.
16
Singha argues that the demand for an Indian passport by the Dominions suggests that the
category of ‘British subject’ was available for division and differentiation based on the rules of
colonial difference. Radhika Viyas Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the
Passport’, in Public Culture: Bulletin of the Project for Transnational Cultural Studies, Vol. 11,
no. 3 (1999), p. 529.
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standards’, so appeasing Indian nationalists’ outrage at the prevalence of a ‘colour bar’ in
international migration.17
The British Indian passport was, in some respects, no different from its
counterparts in post-World War I Western Europe and the United States.18 John Torpey
shows that in these regions, passports functioned as documents that guaranteed the right
to travel, but also whose possession differentiated law-abiding travellers from those
whom the state did not deem suitable to acquire passports. More importantly, passports
delineated nationality, controlled entry and exit from one country to another, and in the
process produced ‘hard-edged’ nation-states.19 The British Indian passport similarly
mandated regulations on travel and emigration, and required adherence to the nowestablished practices of forensic identification. By 1917, as World War I continued, all
Indians, other than indentured labourers and Hajj pilgrims, were required to carry the
British Indian passport if proceeding outside India.20 The Indian Passport Act of 1920, on
the other hand, made the passport a requirement for entry into India, but not for exiting
the region. After 1918, the colonial state sought to retain certain wartime measures,
arguing that the threat of Bolshevism required stricter controls on mobility. After the
passing of the 1920 Act, passport applications were often used by the colonial state as a

Singha, ‘The Great War and a “Proper” Passport for the Colony’, p. 291.
John Torpey’s work on the appearance of passports in post-First World War Europe and
America discusses the emergence of passports due to a need to secure borders. John Torpey, The
Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
19
Torpey argues that the states were not fully effective in controlling or enforcing such a system.
Rather, they only monopolised the authority to restrict movement vis-a-vis other potential
claimants such as private economic or religious entities. Ibid., p. 5.
20
Defence of India Act, 1915, cited in Singha, ‘The Great War and a “Proper” Passport for the
Colony’, p. 292.
17
18
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surveillance mechanism to selectively restrict the mobility of certain people.21
Furthermore, deportations became de rigueur even in cases of technical violations of
passport regulations.
After 1947, both India and Pakistan began the transition to creating national
passports to reflect their changed political status. Initially, the British Indian passport was
re-named the Commonwealth passport, which marked its holders as British subjects. By
July 1948, India had drafted a new ‘Indian’ passport which had two fundamental
changes: the description now read ‘India’ instead of ‘Empire of India’; and the head of
state was noted as the ‘Rashtrapati’ in Hindi and ‘President’ in English, instead of the
‘Governor-General of India’. Furthermore, the Indian passport would no longer be
printed in French. There was a cautionary warning from officials in the Constituent
Assembly: ‘The term “India” cannot however be treated as final until the Constituent
Assembly itself has adopted it’;22 until then, no definition of nationality or citizenship
could be associated with the Indian passport. The new Indian passport controlled
international movement, but special permits controlled mobility between Portuguese and
French territories within India. Citizens of Tibet and the Maldives could get travel passes
to India, while residents of Nepal and Bhutan were not required to carry any documents.
In Pakistan, Kashmiris travelling from Pakistan to their hometowns were required to
obtain special permits.23 Pilgrim passes continued to govern the travel of those Indians
who wanted to make the Hajj pilgrimage.

21

Ibid., pp. 308–13.
CA/105/Comm/48, 1948, Constituent Assembly, Constitution Section, NAI.
23
The India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme would specify further regulations and
restrictions after 1952 for this group of travellers. See 10(10)-K/53, Ministry of States 1953, NAI.
22
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Still, such travels paled in comparison to the post-Partition mass movements
across India’s and Pakistan’s borders. Both countries quickly developed specific sets of
documents to regulate these movements. In July 1948, India adopted a permit system
across its western border with Pakistan to curb what it perceived to be the ‘one way
traffic’ of Muslim refugees. Under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, entry
into India would now require a permit. Pakistan followed suit in October with the
Pakistan (Control of Entry) Ordinance, claiming the need for internal security. However
there was no permit system on the eastern border between West Bengal, Assam, and
Tripura on the Indian side, and East Pakistan.24 The differing policies on the eastern and
western borders stemmed from the Indian state’s understanding of the Partition
experience in divided Bengal, where Partition migration was viewed as unwarranted and
not significant.25
In its goal to regulate specific mobility, i.e., post-Partition movement between
India and Pakistan, permits discarded the idea of the ‘civic credential’ intrinsic to the
British Indian passport, yet continued the requirement for signatures and photographs in
order to identify border-crossers and, more importantly, violators of permit regulations.

24

Before the India–Pakistan passport came into being, East Pakistan residents were often required
to produce tax certificates to prove domicile, while Indian residents were restricted to 15 days
stay in East Pakistan. In that sense, there was some documentary control, however haphazard.
Hindustan Standard (28 April, 1948), p. 1.
25
Several scholars have highlighted this difference in understanding. See Haimanti Roy,
Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947–1965 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2012); Joya Chatterji, ‘“Dispersal” and the Failure of Rehabilitation: Refugee
Camp-Dwellers and Squatters in West Bengal’, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 41, no. 5 (2007),
pp. 995–1032; and Jashodhara Bagchi and Subhoranjan Dasgupta (eds), The Trauma and the
Triumph: Gender and Partition in Eastern India (Kolkata: Stree, 2003). In another recent article,
Joya Chatterji argues that these differing policies in the eastern region indicate a secularisation of
bilateral politics between India and Pakistan. Joya Chatterji, ‘Secularisation and Partition
Emergencies, Deep Diplomacy in South Asia’, in Economic & Political Weekly (14 Dec. 2013),
pp. 42–50.
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Five kinds of permits were issued from diplomatic representatives of India and Pakistan26
located in Bombay, Jullundhar, Karachi and Lahore.27 In true bureaucratic fashion, these
permits were printed in triplicate, bound as booklets, and serially machine-numbered.
One copy was housed with the issuing authority, another with the superintendent of
police at the destination, and the third was given to the border-crosser. Photographs were
de rigueur to connect these slips of paper to the authorised holder.28
While such permits represent, at one level, the desire for bureaucratic order
amidst the chaos of Partition-generated displacement and violence, at another level, as
Vazira Zamindar argues, permits began the process of ‘giving shape to unresolved
questions of citizenship’, especially the citizenship of Muslims in India.29 In Zamindar’s
view, the Indian state differentiated between Hindu and Muslim refugees, requiring the
latter to apply for a permit for ‘permanent return’ to India, while the former could get
permits for ‘permanent resettlement’ and access to the state’s rehabilitation programs.
Zamindar’s argument about permits, that they were a first step in crafting postcolonial citizenship, can be pushed further. The permit system, while unpopular with
border-crossers, provided Indian authorities with an initial template to test its
jurisdictional powers in regulating mobility, and to ascribe certain rights to those who
resided within its borders. This is one of the first instances when the Indian state had full
26

These were a permit for a temporary visit, for resettlement (for Hindus from Pakistan), for
permanent return (for Muslims returning from Pakistan), for repeated travel and for transit travel
between East and West Pakistan.
27
Residents of Pakistan who wanted to travel to India applied to the High Commission in Karachi
or Lahore. See S.K. Mustafa, A Commentary on the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949,
with Exhaustive Notes, Up to-Date Rules and Case Law; Also Containing Useful Information
About Passports, Visas and Pilgrim Passes, Etc. (Lucknow: Peoples Law Book House, 1952), p.
86.
28
Ibid., p. 69. Photographs were required only for the male head of the family.
29
Vazira Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia. Refugees,
Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 102–3.
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authority to decide who was free to move and how to regulate what previously had been
‘free travel’.30
The unpopularity of permits, jurisdictional needs after the promulgation of the
Indian Constitution in 1950, and the need to standardise the control of mobility on their
western and eastern borders, prompted both India and Pakistan to adopt the India–
Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme in October 1952.31 The Scheme introduced a special
India–Pakistan passport that would exist alongside each country’s general passport.
While the latter would regulate international travel, the former would concern itself only
with travel between India and Pakistan. Together, these documents represented the initial
steps towards sovereign nationhood, in line with international law.32 As well, it was
hoped that a proper passport system would control and inhibit smuggling, and better
enforce trade regulations between the two countries.33 However popular understanding
saw them as a singular stopgap measure to curb the ongoing migration of Hindu Bengalis
from East Pakistan to India. A cartoon which appeared one day before the start of the
Scheme showed Nehru drowning in water marked ‘Growing West Bengal Population’,
while he valiantly tried to stop more water pouring through the border wall with a tiny
stopper marked ‘Passport’ (Figure 1).34

30

For details on how the permit system operated in India and Pakistan, see ibid., pp.79–117.
Permits themselves lingered within the document regime. For example, residents of enclaves
such as Dahagram along the eastern border were required to obtain permits for transitting through
Indian territory. Permits are also used to control movement between Jammu and Kashmir, Goa
and Tibet.
32
The Times of India (5 May 1952), p. 1.
33
Dawn (6 and 8 Sept. 1952), p. 1.
34
Amrita Bazar Patrika (14 Oct. 1952), p. 5.
31
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Place Figure 1 hereabouts
Figure 1. ‘Please, Just One Month’. Source: Amrita Bazar Patrika (14 Oct. 1952), p. 5.

The Scheme emerged against the backdrop of two events that impacted upon East
Pakistan and eastern India. The first was in East Pakistan, the Khulna Barisal riots of
1950 that were echoed in Calcutta, and engendered the region’s largest cross-border
migration of Hindus in its aftermath. Attempts by the East Pakistan police to control
communist peasant activists were quickly interpreted in communal terms. Mimetic riots,
which soon spread to eastern India, forced India and Pakistan to conclude the Delhi Pact
which urged migrants to return home.35 While evoking images of post-Partition riots, still
fresh in the public memory, the Khulna Barisal riots also questioned the legitimacy of

35

For more details see Haimanti Roy, Partitioned Lives, esp. Chap. 5.
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Pakistan’s viability as a new nation-state.36 The language riots in Dhaka, in early 1952,
provided the second impetus. Rioting occurred on demands that Bengali, in addition to
Urdu, be designated as Pakistan’s official language. As the East Pakistan state worked to
quell both the demands and the rioters, they often alleged that an ‘Indian Hand’ was
responsible for inciting violence. Consequently, East Pakistani authorities urged for
closed borders on the grounds of national security.
Not surprisingly, in response Pakistan announced in 1952 that it would impose
passport regulations on all its borders with India.37 In a Press Note, Pakistan justified the
need for its own passport and visa scheme, claiming the transition from permits to
passports was logical given that ‘all genuine migrants have already returned to their
respective homes and if they have not then they may be assumed to have no intention of
returning’.38 Passports would delineate two kinds of movement: that engendered by
Partition; and that which was routine and necessitated documentary regulation. For its
part, the Indian government quickly agreed to Pakistan’s initiative, claiming it would
alleviate travel hardship between the two countries. While it was clear that the new
passport system would directly curb the continuous and chronic post-Partition migration
between India and East Pakistan, authorities stressed the benefits of documentary controls
in ‘nationalizing’ terms. C.C. Biswas, the minister for Law and Minority Affairs, noted
that a passport system would ‘compel a large number of people who had interests on both
36

Nearly one million Hindus from East Pakistan and Muslims from India crossed the eastern
border in 1950. However the Delhi Pact was limited in its ability to ensure the return of Hindu
migrants to East Pakistan which India took as a sign that East Pakistan was unable to guarantee
the safety and security of its minority citizens. On the other hand, the return of Muslims to India
was not discussed given the presumptions that they had ‘migrated’ to their perceived homeland.
37
Zamindar argues that Pakistan took the lead in order to identify Muslims coming from India as
Indian nationals and to deny them any claims on Pakistan. Zamindar, The Long Partition, pp.
190–91.
38
Pakistan Government Press Note, The Times of India (5 May 1952), pp. 1, 5.
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sides of the border to make up their minds as to their homeland’.39 Passports finally
would situate people and establish the Indian state’s sovereignty in tangible ways. A
resolution to Partition’s ambiguities regarding nationality and citizenship was reached by
using terms such as ‘Bharati’ or ‘Pakistani’ that became commonplace in officially
published documents and policy instructions. For example, a press note issued by the
Indian deputy high commissioner in Dhaka stated that those ‘Bharati nationals’ who
wished to remain in East Pakistan after the start of the passport system ‘will have to get a
Bharati Passport with a proper visa from Pakistan authorities within three months from
the date of the introduction of the Pakistan–Bharat passport system or before January 15,
1953’.40 Assuring applicants their passport requests would be processed quickly, the press
note emphasised the routineness of the process. Moreover, the application process would
help authorities determine both choices about mobility and the nationality of the
applicant. In this context visas, more than passports, would provide what Aristide Zolberg
calls ‘control through remote control’.41 Visas would determine and verify the identities
of those who did not belong, even before they began their journeys.
Not everyone saw the benefits of implementing a passport system. Arguments
against documentary control came primarily from East Pakistan, which had had ‘open’
borders with India until 1952. The Scheme’s detractors argued that documents would
sunder age-old linguistic and cultural ties between East and West Bengal and impede the
free movement of minority Hindus and Muslims which had been guaranteed by the Delhi
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Pact of 1950.42 Some in India saw the Scheme as a ploy to scare Hindu minorities in East
Pakistan into leaving their homes.43
Despite such reservations, India and Pakistan decided to proceed with this specific
passport system. Representatives met in Karachi between 15 May and 19 May 1952 to
establish modalities. Not surprisingly, the two countries found it difficult to agree. The
disagreements were followed closely in the press of each country, and reflected the
continued build-up of self-reflexive nationalism at its worst. The Morning News in Dhaka
accused the Indian delegation of deliberately ‘sabotaging’ the conference and planning to
‘paralyse the (Pakistan) government’.44 The Times of India (henceforth, The Times)
reported that the Pakistan delegate was ‘uncompromising’, refusing even legitimate
requests by the Indian delegates. The moral high ground was claimed for India; The
Times noted that while Pakistan wanted to start the passport system on 15 August 1952,
India had proposed 15 September as the starting date.45 India thus portrayed itself as one
who sought to give border crossers more time to move freely and thus appear attuned to
the people’s needs. The antagonism continued in subsequent meetings as authorities
negotiated the finer details of the Scheme. Rather than bring ‘categorical closure’ in
defining India and Pakistan, as Zamindar argues,46 adopting and implementing the
passport system continued and even increased the inter-Dominion diplomatic wrangling,
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bureaucratic confusion, and contingent contextual interpretations of documentary
identities.

Technologies of Travel
The India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme finally started on the mutuallyagreed date of 15 October 1952. From that day forward, Indians travelling to Pakistan
would have to obtain both a passport from India and a visa from Pakistan.47 Furthermore,
travellers were required to now pass through officially-sanctioned border checkpoints.48
Visas for Pakistanis travelling to India guaranteed free passage, but required visa holders
to register at police stations, and restricted the number of days they could stay and the
places they could visit in India. Visas helped categorise the purpose of travel and such
categorisation was represented by different kinds of visas, ranging from A to F.49
Within a month of the start of the passport system, the Indian authorities had
received requests for 18,972 visas, 9,607 repatriation certificates, 1,985 migration
certificates, and 9,134 passport applications.50 Passport officials in the eastern region
complained about the considerable hardships and difficulties incurred due to the
‘inevitable delays involved in dealing with a prodigiously large number of applications
for visas, repatriation certificates and migration certificates from single visa offices in
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Dhaka and Calcutta’.51 Despite processing problems, claims for the Scheme’s successful
and smooth operation were supported by front-page pictures of empty border checkpoints
in major newspapers.52
The Scheme was different from its documentary predecessors in a number of
ways. It diversified control by placing the responsibility for issuing passports onto the
states rather than on central ministries and diplomatic missions. It was heavily
bureaucratic both in terms of personnel and paperwork. While the MHA, MEA and the
Ministry of Law consulted on and decided about atypical passport applications, the bulk
of the day-to-day issuing of passports and visas was delegated to the district magistrate or
the regional passport offices. These in turn depended on the state police to investigate the
applicants’ backgrounds and character references which were pre-requisites for any
successful application. Passport conferences between India and Pakistan held at regular
intervals sought to make the application procedure easier, but in the process erased
‘migration’ as a reason for travel.53 Moreover the Scheme oversaw a diversification of
travel documents beyond just passports and visas as travel between India and Pakistan
became categorised in different ways.
From the perspective of Indian officials, routine and hitherto ‘free’ mobility now
came under the Scheme’s requirement for documenting it. For example, cultivators and
petty traders who lived in the borderland (defined as 10 miles on either side of the India–
Pakistan border) now were required to possess an F visa to pursue their livelihoods in this
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region.54 To acquire these visas, borderland residents had to submit to the border
authorities another set of documents—khatian or rent receipts, certificates from a Union
Board or Panchayat president documenting residence, and often certificates from
authorities across the border verifying legal trade and labour.55 These F visas were valid
for five years or until the expiry of the holder’s passport, at which time the visa holder
had to return to the local authorities for renewal. The F visa regulated routine crossborder mobility; but it inadvertently also provided certain documentary ‘rights’ of
residence that would be guaranteed by the Indian state. As well, these documents could,
albeit in limited form, act as new forms of legal tender which protected the holders from
being identified as ‘infiltrators’ and so being deported.56
Obviously, visas were conditional on acquiring a passport. Passports or par patra
were put into different categories: the international form, valid for international travel; the
India–Pakistan passport for travel between India and West Pakistan, valid for one year;
and the India–Pakistan (Eastern Zone) passport for travel between India and East
Pakistan, valid for five years. From their inception, passports ascribed nationality to
border-crossers and connected the individual to the document and to the issuing authority.
The Scheme booklet declared: ‘Pakistan nationals visiting India will be required…to be
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in possession of a valid passport duly visaed by an Indian diplomatic mission abroad, or
by an official in India authorized by the Government of India to issue visas’.57 Those
‘Pakistan nationals’ in India, with or without passports or permits, were to be given a 3month grace period, until 14 January 1953, to either acquire the relevant paperwork to
remain in India or to return to their homes in Pakistan.58 Under the Scheme, successful
applicants now would be able to have documentary proof of their nationality in addition
to travel permissions. Since only Indian citizens could apply for an Indian passport, and
only Pakistan citizens could apply for a Pakistan passport, the Scheme hoped to resolve
the existing ambiguities regarding citizenship in the 1950s.
However the Scheme went beyond just drafting regulations on passports and
visas; it introduced a host of other documents to categorise travel. For example, members
of

‘minority

communities’

in

Pakistan

could

apply

for

migration

or

resettlement/repatriation certificates instead of passports and visas. Migration certificates
required applicants to express their intention to ‘permanently migrate’ to India by
applying to Indian diplomatic missions in Dhaka, Karachi or Lahore.59 Between October
1952 and January 1953, Indian nationals (defined by having residence or family ties in
India) in Pakistan could apply for repatriation certificates that would guarantee a onetime journey back to India. Both the migration certificate and the repatriation certificate
guaranteed single border crossings for an entire family. The Indian state hoped that single
journey certificates would reduce cross-border migration, and officially document that the
applicants, families or individuals, had opted to leave Pakistan and become Indian
citizens. The Scheme also introduced ‘landing cards’ for those Pakistani nationals who
57
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may have fallen ill while in transit through India, and Nullies or Continuous Discharge
Certificates for Pakistani seamen that would allow them to disembark and find
employment in India. Under the Scheme, every kind of travel and traveller would be
neatly categorised, and Indian authorities would establish not only bureaucratic order, but
also legitimise it through such certificates.
This blueprint for documentary order remained limited by rolling timelines,
contextual interpretations of ambiguous policies, and insufficient resources and
personnel.60 For example, confusion arose over the term ‘minority community’ which
was the basic criteria for migration certificates. Were Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan the
only groups who came under such rubric? Or did it define everyone who was not
Muslim? What about members of Scheduled Castes whom Pakistan claimed were not
part of the Hindu community in Pakistan and therefore not minorities? MHA and MEA
officials reasoned that although applicants for migration certificates were primarily
Hindus and Sikhs, certificates should be issued to all non-Muslim residents of Pakistan.61
But this decision raised another dilemma; if all Pakistani non-Muslims were,
hypothetically, eligible for migration certificates, India could potentially be inundated by
the entire non-Muslim population of Pakistan. This would defeat the intention of the
Scheme. Consequently, Indian authorities decided that migration certificates would not
60
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be automatically issued, but would depend on the worth of each application.62 Low-level
bureaucrats at the High Commissions in Karachi and Dhaka were instructed that
‘facilities for migration should be given in all genuine cases but should not be available to
every member of the minority community regardless of the merits of the case’.63 Further,
those who had landed property or a business in Pakistan were not entitled to procure
migration certificates ‘unless there was a danger to their life’, or in cases involving
‘danger to the honour of women folk’.64 It was not clear how applicants were to proffer
evidence to this effect. What was clear was that India’s humanitarian claims had to defer
to the economic imperatives of limiting refugee and migrant populations.
The instructions were particularly relevant to Hindu applicants located in East
Pakistan as they sought to maintain both family ties in India and residential rights in
Pakistan. Thus they would often apply for Pakistani passports and visas for India, which
guaranteed them multiple journeys, rather than migration certificates. Having Pakistani
passports also helped since, at the ‘time of leaving Pakistan, migrants [were] subjected to
special searches and other harassments which persons travelling on Pakistan passports do
not have to undergo’.65 Acquiring a Pakistani passport could also be used as documentary
proof that one was not an evacuee or an ‘intending evacuee’; this allowed people to retain
their claims to property that were in danger of falling under, and becoming forfeit to, the
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rules of the Evacuee Property Laws.66 Thus the utilitarian benefits of acquiring a passport
were clear to the applicants.
However such utilitarian interpretations of travel documents conflicted with the
Indian state’s conception of the links between documents, travel and citizenship. These
conceptions came into sharper focus in discussions about those who had arrived in India
with Pakistani passports. Early on, Article 9 of the Constitution of India had clearly
linked the passport with citizenship by noting that if one voluntarily acquired a foreign
passport, one would automatically lose Indian citizenship.67 This generated different sets
of discussions depending on the religious identity of those who held Pakistani passports.
While Muslims returning to India on Pakistani passports often found it difficult to claim
Indian citizenship, Indian authorities debated whether Hindus from Pakistan travelling on
Pakistani passports should be treated differently and allowed to become Indian citizens in
the future. In a secret circular, MHA officials acknowledged the benefits of Hindu
minorities in Pakistan obtaining a Pakistani passport, but also pointed out that there was a
‘growing feeling in Pakistan that persons who take Pakistani passports thereby affirm
their intention of staying in Pakistan and it is undesirable that this feeling should in any
way be discouraged’.68 Rather, Hindus with Pakistani passports should be allowed less
restricted travel once in India, but directed to retain their Pakistani passports until the
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passage of the Indian Citizenship Act which would enable them to be naturalised as
Indian citizens.
The cases of Hindus with Pakistani passports who wanted to permanently settle in
India created two bureaucratic problems that needed resolution: whether they could
renounce their Pakistani nationality by simply surrendering their Pakistani passports; and
whether they were legally on the same footing as those Hindus who had arrived in India
on migration certificates. Badruddin Tyabji, a lawyer and member of parliament, argued
on grounds of intentionality that the two were different:
I would not recommend giving persons who come over to India on Pakistani
passports exactly the same facilities as those who come over on Migration
Certificates. Some difference must be made between those who leave East Bengal
definitely with the intention of migrating to India and becoming Indian citizens
irrevocably; and those who come with an unsettled mind on Pakistani passports and
wish to keep a foot in both camps. If they find conditions in India more favourable,
they would stay on in India; but if they did not they could go back to Pakistan on
their Pakistani passports.69

Note to typesetter: Please do not indent this sentence For Tyabji, the link between
nationality and passports was clear. Those with Pakistani passports should be treated as
Pakistani citizens, irrespective of whether they were Hindus or Muslims.
In contrast C.C. Biswas, the minister for Law and Minority Affairs, argued that
rather than being an indication of an ‘unsettled mind’, the acquisition of a Pakistani
passport was utilitarian: ‘More often than not, this is the safer and easier course which
saves the migrant from the “special searches” and “other harassments” to which holders
of Migration Certificates are subjected’.70 For Biswas, the final intention of both
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migrate to India. Intention, rather than documentation, he argued, should determine
citizenship and both groups should be treated equally by India.
Y.K. Puri, a high-level MEA diplomat, disagreed on legal and constitutional
grounds. He pointed out that Indian authorities had no legal basis to cancel a Pakistani
passport and cited the following example:
Suppose that we withdraw or cancel the Pakistan passport and issue the holder an
Indian passport for a visit to East Bengal, the government of Pakistan may refuse to
recognize the change of nationality, may refuse to permit the person to enter Pakistan
on an Indian passport or let him depart from Pakistan once he gets there.71

Note to typesetter: Please do not indent this sentence Puri agreed that Hindus from East
Pakistan were Pakistani nationals, but also suggested that India should provide them with
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This discussion, carrie4d out via high-level bureaucratic letters and memos,
highlights a significant addition to the mandate of the Scheme. While it would continue to
categorise and legitimise inter-Dominion mobility, the multitude of travel documents
would further link and determine the nationality of its holders. These documents offered
different outcomes regarding nationality, depending on whether the travellers were
Hindus or Muslims.

Documenting Muslim Nationality
The Scheme became one of the central mechanisms, along with the Indian
Constitution of 1950, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955 and the amended Foreigner’s
Act of 1957, in evaluating and determining claims of Indian citizenship. Such claims,
while guided by regulations on domicile and birth, were also determined on the basis of
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who could and did hold an Indian passport. For Muslims who had either gone to Pakistan
in the aftermath of 1947 and hoped to return home to India, or those who simply travelled
to Pakistan to visit relatives or on regular work, an application for a travel document
raised intriguing questions of nationality and belonging: Was an application for an India–
Pakistan passport (to travel to Pakistan) a confirmation of lack of allegiance to India?
Could Muslims who returned to India on Pakistani passports, like members of the Hindu
minorities, renounce their passports and be regarded as Indians?
Muslims who worked in Pakistan but maintained families and properties in India
were the first major group to anticipate the problematic linkages between residence and
citizenship that the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme failed to resolve. Muslims
in India and Hindus in Pakistan who worked in government and military offices had been
given the option to work with the government of their choice. Over a thousand such men
who worked in the East Bengal Railways resigned in early 1952 in anticipation of the
passport system restricting travel to India.72 The Scheme mandated that in order to work
for the Pakistan government in East Pakistan, Muslims would have to acquire Pakistani
passports for travel between their families in India and their work in East Pakistan. Their
applications for Indian passports were routinely denied on the grounds that they were not
Indian citizens and hence were ineligible. Citizenship in this instance was determined by
the Indian Constitution which stated that one needed to be domiciled within the territories
of India on 26 January 1950, the date of promulgation of the Constitution.73
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Tridip Kumar Chaudhuri, a Lok Sabha MP from Murshidabad, took up the case of
some of these workers in the Indian parliament. He argued that refusal of an Indian
passport was unconstitutional since these men were registered to vote in India.74 In
response, Anil Chanda, the MEA deputy minister, argued that domicile rather than voting
rights determined one’s citizenship. According to Chanda, those without domicile in
India on 26 January 1950 were ‘migrants’ and were deemed to have ‘migrated to
Pakistan. Thus they were not Indian nationals and were ineligible for Indian passports’.75.
To ensure the ability to travel and visit their families, these men and others like them had
no option but to apply for Pakistani passports. However, this automatically disqualified
them from claims to Indian citizenship as per Article 9 of the Indian Constitution, a
disqualification that was reiterated in the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955.
The links between the India–Pakistan passports and Indian citizenship became
clear in the well-known case of a minor, Wajid Alam.76 Alam, who had lived with his
mother Bibi Sahar Bano in Gaya, Bihar, had moved to East Pakistan in 1952 when he
was 12. Around mid 1954 he had decided to return home to Gaya, but realised he had
missed the deadline to procure a repatriation certificate from the Indian embassy in
Dhaka. His only option to return home was to get a Pakistani passport. He arrived in
India on a short-term visa with this passport. He continued to live in India, requesting
visa extensions until 1956, when the Bihar authorities refused to grant an extension and
74
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requested him to leave India and apply to the Indian High Commission in Karachi for the
next extension. At this point his mother, Bibi Sahar Bano, decided to contest the denial
and brought a writ petition against the Bihar government.
In her petition, Bibi Sahar Bano made two critical arguments in disputing the
claim that her son’s Pakistani passport made him a Pakistani national: (1) her son did not
need an Indian visa since he was an Indian citizen; and (2) his travel to East Pakistan was
not ‘voluntary’ because he was a minor at the time. Furthermore, her son had ‘obtained
the Pakistan passport merely as a device to come back to India and that he had not the
intention of becoming a citizen of Pakistan’.77 Therefore, in 1954 Wajid Alam had had no
intention of becoming a Pakistani national, nor had he had the legal capability to make
such a decision. The Pakistani passport, the petition argued, was a travel document, a
utilitarian device to enable him to return to his home in India.
Beyond the deliberations of the Patna High Court, the case received much
attention from authorities at the ministries of Home Affairs and Law.78 The latter’s
response to Alam’s case is worth noting. The Law authorities disputed Bano’s petition on
two grounds: first, they argued that Wajid Alam had ‘migrated’ to East Pakistan and had
acquired the Pakistani passport voluntarily. To support this claim, they argued that Alam
was not a minor since the India–Pakistan passport was only issued to adults.79 They
argued that even though Pakistan might have a lower age limit for recognising an adult,
the fact that he had been regarded as an adult in Pakistan meant he could not now claim
to be a minor in India. Secondly, they argued that if Alam was indeed an Indian citizen,
77
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then he should have made a claim to citizenship immediately upon his return. His claim
was being made now only because he had been denied a visa extension. Consequently,
there was not sufficient proof of ‘intent’ that Alam wanted to make India his home.
The Patna High Court’s decision in favour of Sahr Bano and its instruction to
Alam to apply for Indian citizenship stepped on the toes of the MHA and Law ministry
bureaucrats, who noted petulantly: ‘We can of course refuse to register Wajid Alam as an
Indian citizen without assigning any reason…. We may also add that application of Wajid
Alam for Indian citizenship should not be accepted but should be referred to the Central
Government for orders’.80 Although it is unclear whether Alam did apply for Indian
citizenship or whether his application was eventually approved, the case was significant
because it established precedence in legal terms and helped the MHA craft a clear process
for subsequent cases.81 From this point on, the central government became the arbiter in
the cases of those who arrived in India with Pakistani passports but claimed Indian
citizenship. The number and frequency of such cases in the late 1950s and 1960s
highlights the disjunction between official understanding of the India–Pakistan passport
as a document certifying nationality, even when it had no legal basis, and the popular
perception of the passport as a practical document facilitating travel.
By the time the Indian Citizenship Act came into force in 1955, visas for travel to
India had largely become short-term, usually for three months. Consequently, travel had
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become ‘temporary’ even as passport applications and requests for extensions of shortterm visas became commonplace. What also assumed regularity were violations of visa
directives, especially for ‘overstaying’ beyond the stipulated period.82 Local authorities
often served deportation notices on those whose visas had expired. These notices were
frequently countered by applications for permanent settlement in India.83 Sometimes they
were contested in court via submission of writ petitions under Section 80 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.84 In both applications for permanent settlement and writ petitions, the
usual outcome was an extension of stay for the petitioner. Local authorities in
Maharashtra noted: ‘The application for civil suit takes more than year and many times it
is dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This enables them to file a fresh
application and thus they prolong their stay in India as much as possible’.85 What is
apparent from these manoeuvrings is that some travellers had quickly figured out a
process by which they could hope to circumvent the Indian state’s controls over their
mobility.
For their part, Indian authorities declined petitions routinely. Beyond pointing out
that the applicants had returned to India after officially-mandated cut-off dates, and had
violated the visa regulations by overstaying,86 they often regarded the possession of a
Pakistani passport as definitive proof of a Muslim petitioner’s nationality. By 1960,
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Indian ministry authorities were instructing their state counterparts to immediately report
any pertinent writ petitions against the government, popularly known as 80 CPC
petitions, so that
Full facts of the case may be collected immediately and furnished to this Ministry
(MHA) along with the observations and recommendations of the state government so
as to enable the Central Government to determine the nationality within the notice
period. After it has been determined that [the] person has ceased to be an Indian
citizen, he can straightaway be deported to Pakistan after serving him with an order
to leave India without any formalities.87

Note to typesetter: Please do not indent this sentence Contesting the legality of
deportation notices through civil suits required the petitioner to either find fault with the
government on grounds of procedure, or to claim Indian citizenship. The outcomes of
such suits involved the regional High Courts and sometimes the Supreme Court of India.
After Wajid Alam’s case, the New Delhi ensured that it would be the primary arbitrator
in such cases of disputed nationality.
The contextual interpretation of citizenship laws and the links between the India–
Pakistan passport and national identity became clear in the case of Haroon Haji Shakoor
who had petitioned authorities in Bombay for ‘permanent stay’.88 Like Wajid Alam,
Shakoor had been born in India and was taken to West Pakistan as a minor while his
parents continued to live in India. In 1956, upon his father’s death, Shakoor acquired a
Pakistani passport and returned to India. Between 1956 and 1961, he went back and forth
between the two countries before finally applying for ‘permanent settlement’ in India.89
In his petition, Shakoor stressed that he was an Indian citizen with no ‘love for Pakistan’.
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Local authorities in Bombay disagreed, noting that ‘he would not make good citizenship
of India [sic]’. Unlike Alam’s case, the MHA sought to disregard the fact that Shakoor
was a minor when he first went to Pakistan. Instead, what was significant was that
Shakoor had not returned to India immediately upon becoming an adult. Moreover, the
ministry determined that Shakoor’s patriotic claims had little merit and his petition was a
ruse to extend his stay in India so he could be with his mother.
Denial of Shakoor’s application was almost inevitable. Shakoor’s Pakistani
passport was taken as definitive proof of his nationality and the MHA advised authorities
in Bombay to ‘issue a deportation order against the Pakistani national for his immediate
expulsion from India’.90 As a result, both the assumptions made about nationality and the
actions that followed found sanction in the documentary proof provided by the India–
Pakistan passport. What is also significant is the contrast between common
understandings of a passport as a travel document, and the official use of it to prove the
‘Pakistani’ nationality of certain Muslims.
In contrast to Alam’s and Shakoor’s cases, Mohsin Khan’s application for
permanent stay had a very different outcome.91 Seemingly, Khan, a tailor by profession,
had a similar trajectory to Alam and Shakoor. He and his family had migrated to Pakistan
in 1947, returned to India in 1955 on a Pakistan passport and a short-term Indian visa,
and then applied for permanent resettlement. Local authorities in their home state of Uttar
Pradesh advised them of their ineligibility and suggested they return to Pakistan and
apply for permanent resettlement in India from there. Khan went to Pakistan but returned
to India in 1957 on another short-term visa. By 1958, he had ‘overstayed’ and when
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Indian authorities sent him notice to this effect, they discovered that he and his family
had ‘disappeared’. Authorities finally located them in Delhi and began legal proceedings
for the family’s deportation.
At this point, Mohsin Khan appealed to the chief commissioner of Delhi for
clemency, arguing he was a ‘faithful and loyal citizen of India’. Although the chief
commissioner had little power in arbitrating such cases, Khan, who had been a tailor to
the high-level bureaucrat hoped that such access might help his case. The chief
commissioner wrote to the MHA requesting a positive outcome for Khan’s application.
The fact that Khan did not own any property in India and had no claims to evacuee
property helped further his case. In 1962, the MHA finally decided in favour of Khan’s
petition, with the caveat that he would have to retain his Pakistani nationality. Khan’s
access to bureaucratic patronage had helped him remain in India, but his Pakistan
passport was taken as documentary proof the family had divested itself of any claim of
Indian citizenship.
There were many such cases regarding the legitimacy of the movement of Muslim
individuals and their contextual relationship with the documentary regime of the India–
Pakistan passport during the 1950s and 1960s. During this period the general Indian
passport also contributed to framing an understanding of citizenship through documents.
Mention may be made here of two writ petitions, one filed by a wealthy, Bombay-based
Parsee, K.S. Nagporewalla and his wife in 1959, and the other filed by Satwant Singh
Sawhney in 1967, both of which contested the right of the Indian state to deny a passport
to citizens whose nationality was not in question. In the Sawhney case, which in a rare
feat reached the Supreme Court, the right to free movement both within and outside India
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was argued to be evidence of the ‘personal liberties’ guaranteed by the Indian
Constitution. Chief Justice G. Subbarao agreed. He ruled: ‘A person resident in India has
a fundamental right to travel abroad and the refusal by the government to issue him a
passport is a denial of the rights to personal liberty, equality before the law guaranteed by
the Constitution of India’.92 Thus, if the personal liberty of an Indian citizen included the
right to travel, denial of a passport for no good reason could be linked to an infringement
of individual citizenship rights by the state.93
The Passport Act of 1967, brought in in the aftermath of the Sawhney case,
sought to merge the India–Pakistan passport with the international one. It clarified that,
from this point forward, passports and visas would guarantee travel but nothing else.
Furthermore, both the MHA and the MEA delegated most of the authority for issuing
passports to five regional passport centres across India. As a document guaranteeing the
right to travel, the Indian passport would be available to all Indians and could only be
denied under certain conditions. It would seem that the contextual delineation of
citizenship under the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme had finally been put to
rest.

Conclusion: Documentary Mandates and Popular Understandings of Paper Rights
Legally, the Indian passport is not a citizenship document; it only guarantees the right of
mobility insofar as it guarantees the right to return to India. Nevertheless it continues to
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be popularly perceived as a document which can certify one’s nationality and right of
residence in India. This disjuncture between legal reality and popular perception
originated in the ways in which the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme was
implemented in the 1950s and the ways in which the India–Pakistan passport was used
differently, to allow and extend citizenship claims to Hindus while denying them to
Muslims others.
By shifting focus away from Partition-related displacement to routine mobility in
the 1950s and 1960s, I have tried to highlight the disjuncture between state documentary
mandates and popular understandings of mobility controls, and provide a basis for
understanding the persistent and growing linkages between documents and identities in
contemporary India. Through the Scheme Indian authorities in the 1950s and 1960s used
travel documents to determine citizenship and nationality. The paper trail of applications,
petitions, official memos, and writ petitions also served to introduce the new Indian state
to those who wanted to live within its borders. By contrast, individuals applying for
India–Pakistan passport documents viewed them as merely utilitarian artefacts that would
facilitate their movement between India and Pakistan. But the applicants were also aware
of the potential for these documents to mark nationality and guarantee the right to work
and remain in India, by either overriding or confirming other legal, bureaucratic criteria
such as birthplace, domicile, and property ownership. Bureaucratic and legal interactions
between Indian authorities and putative citizens under the rubric of the Scheme thus
created the perception that passports certified citizenship. Even though the Passport Act
of 1967 completely repudiated this position and clearly designated the Indian passport as
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only a travel document, the already-established links between such documents and
citizenship would not be overturned.
Subsequent decades have witnessed repeated claims for citizenship on the part of
those whose presence in India has come under official scrutiny.94 In the absence of ‘paper
rights’ or documents certifying citizenship, it is the ‘citizen’ who has learned only too
well the important lesson of creating a documentary trail to prove citizenship. Access to
travel documents continues to delineate the lines between legal and illegal, between
citizens and infiltrators, and between legitimate and illegitimate migration. For example,
those residents of north-eastern borderland states, especially Bengali Muslims who are
either citizens of India or Bangladesh remain targets of border control; (For example,
Indian citizens living in the northeastern borderland states, especially Bengali Muslims,
both within India and from Bangladesh, remain targets of border control;) in the absence
of documentary proof, they are viewed as ‘infiltrators’ or ‘illegal migrants’. These
‘infiltrators’ continue to proffer the Indian passport and other documents as proof of their
citizenship amidst bureaucratic assertions of forgery.95 The Indian passport continues to
exist beyond its legal scope, acting as a document that promises inclusion (or exclusion)
within the contemporary Indian body politic.
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